Using RFID to identify smart products on a blockchain enabled production network by Csikós, Sándor et al.






USING RFID TO IDENTIFY SMART PRODUCTS ON A BLOCKCHAIN 







1University of Szeged Faculty of Engineering, Mars tér 7, 6724, Szeged, Hungary, 
2University of Óbuda Doctoral School of Security Science, Bécsi út 96/b, 1034, Budapest, Hungary, 
e-mail: csikos-s@mk.u-szeged.hu 
 
Received: May 31, 2021 • Accepted: June 21, 2021 
 
ABSTRACT 
Industry 4.0 requires the cooperation of several technologies. The intersections of these technologies present us with 
new challenges. One of these challenges is identification, since we have to identify all the items that are on the network 
that do work and those that are worked upon. If we fail to identify one of these items the network is presented with an 
unidentified potentially malicious device or a misidentified product which can cause production to halt. Blockchains or 
otherwise known as Distributed Ledger Technology, DLT for short is a technology that builds upon the current 
bookkeeping paradigm and expands it in a decentralized direction. This however can be used in more than just banking 
since it is essentially a distributed database that has memory of past events not just the current state. By using a 
blockchain based distributed database to hold processing details and using RFID-s as keys to certain entries in the 
database it is possible to build a tamper proof production system that can handle the challenges of industry 4.0. It may 
also be possible to use blockchain technology as a form of digital paper trail that can be used to validate messages sent 
to the nodes of the system. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Industry 4.0 has been labelled with many titles, one of these is Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) [1], 
which is the Internet of Things (IoT) using standardised devices and achieving greater reliability. 
Regardless if were talking about industrial or regular IoT the main takeaway is that devices are connected 
on a network where they potentially can reach any other device on the network. At first glance this is a 
dangerous notion, since it presents an exploit also its difficult to implement since all devices need to be 
uniquely identifiable. According to a projection by Watanabe and Fan [2] there were to be between 26-50 
billion devices connected to the internet by 2020 with no signs that the number of devices will slow their 
current trend. In case of fewer devices we could use IPv4, but such high numbers require IPv6 and its 
derivatives. 
1.1. Security threats of Industry 4.0 
Khan and Salah [3] place the threats in three categories depending on what level the attack is executed on. 
Low level attacks encompass those threats that endanger the hardware or the communications physical and 
data link layers. These attacks include: 
- Jamming adversaries – In case of wireless communication broadcasting signals on the same frequency 
as required by the protocol, but the signals don’t adhere to the communication protocol. (Physical layer 
attack) 
- Insecure initialization – For a system to work properly it needs a secure initialization and setup 
mechanism on its physical layer, if there is none unauthorized devices can listen in on the physical 
layers communication. 
- Low level Sybil and spoofing attacks – Sybil attacks are those attacks when an unauthorised device 
disguises itself as an authorised device and tries to eat up network resources. (Physical layer attack) 






- Insecure physical interface – The proper working of a device can be interfered with on physical ports 
such as USB or programming ports. These can be used by attackers to get access to other devices on 
the network (Hardware level attack) 
- Sleep deprivation attack – This attack applies to devices with limited energy stores, when they need to 
work longer than designed for the battery will quickly drain. (Data link layer attack) 
Intermediate level attacks are the attacks that use the network, transport or session layer, a few examples of 
such attacks: 
- Replay or duplication attacks due to fragmentation – IPv6 packets need to be fragmented for devices 
that work according to IEEE 802.15.4, this is due to the fact that the frame size is smaller. In the case 
that a device receives duplicates of these packets, reassembling these consumes more than the 
allocated resources. This can cause buffer overflow and the reboot of the device (network layer attack). 
- Insecure neighbour discovery – devices in wireless mesh networks need to discover neighbours to be 
able to communicate with them. Packets from an unauthorised source can lead to a denial of service 
attack (network level attack). 
- Buffer reservation attack – a devices buffer memory that is used to assemble packets can be filled with 
incomplete packets, this causes a denial of service attack since the memory holding the incomplete 
packets is not freed (network level attack). 
- RPL routing attack – the IPv6 routing protocol for Low-Powered and lossy networks (RPL) is 
vulnerable to several attacks from compromised devices on the network, these can deplete network 
resources (network level attack). 
- Sinkhole and wormhole attacks – in case of sinkhole attacks the attacker responds to the routing 
request thereby causing the traffic to flow through the attacker node, this can be used to perform 
malicious activity on the network. In the case of wormhole attacks there is an tunnel through which 
eavesdropping, privacy violation and denial of service attacks can be executed (network level attack). 
- Sybil attacks on intermediate layers – devices on the networks with false identities can initiate 
spamming, spreading of malware and phishing attacks (network layer attack). 
- Authentication and secure communication – devices and users need to be authenticated by 
authenticated by key management systems. Flaws embedded in these systems house several 
vulnerabilities to the network (network and transport layer attack).  
- Transport level end-to-end security – the purpose of this system in the transport layer is to ensure that 
the senders message securely arrives to the receiver (transport and network layer attack). 
- Session establishment and resumption – session hijacking with forged messages can lead to denial of 
service attacks, also the attacker can impersonate the victim and can receive the packets meant for the 
victim (transport layer attack) 
- Privacy violation on cloud based IoT – there are several attacks that target identity and location 
privacy on cloud based IoT networks. Similarly a malicious cloud service provider can access 
confidential information transmitted by us. 
High level security issues are those that use the application layer to execute attacks, a few of these attacks 
are: 
- CoAP security with internet – Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is used by devices that have 
very limited resources. CoAP messages follow a format described in RFC-7252 which needs to be 
encrypted for secure communication. 
- Insecure interfaces – we can access IoT devices through the web, mobile or cloud. These interfaces are 
vulnerable to several attacks that target data privacy. 
- Insecure software/firmware – IoT devices using SQLi and XSS languages need to be tested carefully 
and updates need to be carried out in a secure manner. 
- Middleware security – the middleware for the heterogeneous communication of IoT devices needs to 
be secure enough to provide this service. 






1.2 The role of RFID in Industry 4.0 
From the list of described problems we continue our exploration in the narrowed down scope to the 
problems within identification and secure communication, since smart products fall into this category and 
these are one of the innovations of Industry 4.0. Smart products are products that though directly or 
indirectly contain instructions for their production. By this we mean that they are identifiable and they 
contain information for their production either in their own memory or somewhere in a database that we 
can access during production. For product identification there are many solutions such as optical 
recognition, 1 and 2 dimensional bar codes as well as identification through RFID tags. In production 
systems 1 and 2 dimensional bar codes only hold information for identification all other information is 
stored in an external database. The advantage of this method is that a central database holds the instructions 
for production the product itself can’t be used to inject malicious instructions also updating production 
instructions can be done by editing the database’s corresponding entry. All foreign products can be 
identified if they contain an unknown bar code. However a problem arises as the identification data can be 
read freely since it is not encrypted, this can be circumvented as the identification data can be stored 
encrypted. Another problem that can arise is that products can be mislabelled with a barcode that belongs 
on a product with different properties that the labelled product. The advantage of barcodes is that they are 
cheap to produce and are not sensitive to electromagnetic noise.  
RFID tags on the other hand are quite susceptible to electromagnetic noise, but carry a few advantages 
compared to barcodes. Firstly line of sight is not required unlike for barcodes where there is a possibility 
that the barcode has faded. Second RFID tags are rewritable and so can hold the instructions for production 
or at least part of it. The main advantage of this is that it can reduce the number of network queries but it 
also presents problems as well. If we believe the read data without checking that could be hazardous for it 
could be a destructive instruction (ex: set the temperature beyond what is required), another problem is that 
since the tag holds the instructions this could be read out at any time. This is bad since details of production 
can be stolen this way from the product itself. This brings us to the problem of mutual authentication, 
meaning we want to identify the device and the reader as well. Since RFID tags have limited resources any 
method we design has to take this into account. The problem of mutual authentication has been tackled by 
Sidorov et al. [4] and Mujahid et al. [5]. The proposed solutions provide protection against unauthorized 
reading, playback, man-in-the-middle, synchronization disrupting and tracking attacks, however the 
solutions proposed require 520 seconds for the communication to conclude, this area can use further 
improvement. 
There are several case studies that present the advantages of production chains that use RFID technology 
[6]. These solutions require a database that houses the data required for production. In the case of a 
distributed database each node would have a copy of the records and the queries could be done locally. The 
solution we are proposing is a blockchain based system. There have been studies that explore the 
possibilities of using blockchains in the production system [7]. 
2. BLOCKCHAINS AT A GLANCE 
The words blockchain and cryptocurrency propose popular new technologies, however their overabundant 
use might cause us to think they are nothing more than buzzwords, and cause us to miss out on this 
revolutionary new technology. Blockchains or Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) is a technology that 
solves the problem of bookkeeping in a decentralized way, but the technology has far more uses other than 
bookkeeping. The currently used bookkeeping method is called double entry bookkeeping since every 
entry needs at least 2 pieces of data from where are we transferring and to where are we transferring to 
(credit and debit). This bookkeeping is done by trusted third parties such as banks or bookkeepers. 
However this system is not without flaws since it is human based it is prone to errors and corruption. 
Blockchains offer a distributed trust free alternative. It is hard to give a definitive answer when will 
blockchain technology become a part of everyday life, there are those that equate it to the TCP protocol 






which started out as a niche application and evolved to the backbone of the internet [8]. Currently there are 
3 generations of blockchain technology. 
2.1 First generation blockchains 
The first generation of blockchain was proposed in a paper by Satoshi Nakamoto [9] it is currently 
unknown who he is and it may be possible that it is the work of a group rather than an individual. In the 
paper it is proposes a system where each entity that wants to do transactions has a public and a private key 
and all transactions are held in an open ledger. In each transaction the recipient is identified by their public 
key and we add a reference to the previous transaction, this information is hashed. Hashing is a 
mathematical function that produces a fixed length extract of the input called a hash. The hashing function 
has the following properties it is a one way function that is easy to compute. Meaning it is easy to calculate 
the hash of a given input but it is practically impossible to do the inverse of the operation (retrieve the input 
from the hash). The hash is used to make the entries tamper proof, since any change will produce a totally 
different hash. The final step in the transaction is that the sender signs the transaction with their private key 
as shown in Fig. 1. 
 
Figure 1. Transactions on a blockchain 
 
The transactions then go to nodes called miners that place several transactions in a block, each block has 
the previous blocks hash and a number used only once (nonce) value as shown in Fig. 2. The miners need 
to figure out the value of the nonce so that the hash of the new block will start with a set number of zeroes, 
this is the process known as mining. Once the nonce has been calculated the node sends the newly mined 
block to the other nodes so they can validate the block, the process is called proof-of-work, if the block 
gets validated it is added to the blockchain. This proof-of-work mechanism is called a distributed systems 
consensus mechanism, it is a method by which the nodes can come to an agreement. 







Figure 2. The structure of a blockchain 
Since the only way to figure out the value of the nonce is to try all the values until there is a correct one it 
is computationally expensive, to reward their work the node that finds the correct nonce receives payment 
in cryptocurrency. The difficulty of the mining process can be adjusted up or down by adjusting the 
number or zeroes that are required to be in beginning of the hash, fewer zeroes easier, more zeroes increase 
the difficulty. Nodes follow a few simple rules on the network, they all receive all the transactions but not 
necessarily in the same order. Since all nodes have a copy of the blockchain they work on it can cause 
problems if the order of transactions is not the same for all nodes. In this case since the nonce for the 
blocks is correct they get attached to the blockchain and cause a fork. Since nodes always prefer the longest 
blockchain these forks in the blockchain die off, the transactions are logged in a different block.  
Data security specifies three criteria that need to be addressed these are integrity, availability and 
discretion. The hashing ensures that the transactions are not altered on the blockchain. By being 
distributed, meaning every node has a copy of the blockchain availability is ensured. However discretion is 
not provided, while it is true that there is anonymity because of the public keys, the transactions cannot be 
denied every transaction is visible. There are so called permissioned blockchains, these unlike public 
blockchains don’t allow anyone to read/write on the blockchain only those who are authorized. 
Permissioned blockchains meet all the criteria of data security. The only way to falsify an entry in a 
blockchain is to recalculate every nonce of every block following the one we wish to falsify this needs to 
be done faster than the blockchains can produce new blocks, which is really computation intensive. Such 
attacks are called 51% attacks, since the blockchain is constantly growing the attacker needs to have more 
computational power than the rest of the network to exceed the other nodes in calculating the nonce. 
2.2 Second generation blockchains 
The second generation of blockchains builds on the first generation by creating smart contracts [10] these 
are programs that are stored and executed on the blockchain. The purpose of these smart contracts is to 
execute when certain predefined conditions are met. The first generation two blockchain is Etherium which 
creates an Etherium Virtual Machine (EVM). This can be thought of as a quasi-Turing complete computer 
the quasi nature comes from the fact that there’s maximum computational capacity which is a parameter 
called gas [11]. Another big difference between Etherium and Bitcoin is that the newer version of Etherium 
uses proof-of-stake instead of proof-of-work for a consensus mechanism where nodes do not compete with 
each other to find the nonce. According to the trends of the second generation we are heading for a global 
decentralized cloud based computer. 
2.3 Third generation blockchains 
The third generation of blockchains differs from the previous two by incorporating the notion of 
scalability, sustainability and interoperability which are major problems of the first two generations. 
Blockchains have a problem with scalability, meaning that the performance of the system does not increase 
linearly with the number of nodes in the system. Transactions per second (TPS) in the case of Bitcoin has a 






theoretical maximum of 7 TPS and an average of 3-4 TPS. In comparison with some other money 
transferring systems VISA has a maximum of 56000 TPS and an average of 2000 TPS while PayPal is 
capable of 170 TPS [12]. The cause of this problem is the size of each block in the blockchain which has 
been set to 1 MB by Satoshi Nakamoto [13], a larger block size means more transactions can be processed 
at the same time and has the potential to drastically increase the TPS. Other cryptocurrencies experiment 
with greater block sizes but as of yet there is no quantifiable data. Generally it is true that the more nodes a 
system has the more resources are needed for its operation, since every node needs a copy of the 
blockchain it is not an easy thing to accomplish and may not be possible with nodes that have few 
resources and may not be necessary. 
Another problem with first and second generation blockchains is sustainability. Nodes running the proof-
of-work consensus mechanism collectively have a power consumption that rivals small countries [14]. To 
make the calculation of the nonce more feasible crypto-miners group themselves in mining pools where 
they pool their computational capacity and share in the rewards. Clumping together in pools detracts from 
the decentralized aspect of the blockchain since this way an attacker doesn’t need to control the blockchain 
just the mining pool [15]. There are some alternatives to proof-of-work one of which is proof-of-stake [16]. 
In the case of proof-of-stake nodes do not compete with each other to be the first one to find the nonce, in 
this case nodes stake a specified amount of cryptocurrency the amount of which influences their chance to 
be chosen to validate the next block. In the case the validation is correct the staked amount plus the 
transaction fees are returned once the other nodes have checked the work, if it is detected that the node has 
cheated the staked amount is lost, this motivates honest behaviour. 
The problem with interoperability is that transactions between different cryptocurrencies are difficult to 
achieve without a third party. The most prominent third generation blockchains are Cardano and IOTA. 
3. DISCUSSION 
According to Miloslavskaya the technology can be used for a secure information and event management 
systems (SIEM) database [17], but it has applications in other fields as well. The database built upon 
blockchain technology is much more resistant to traditional hacking attempts than conventional databases, 
once the scalability problem is solved it can be used as an un-falsifiable currency or a way to hold elections 
[18], or abstractly speaking the validation of past events such as the traceability of wood in the lumber 
industry, or validation of news sources. Smart contracts provide an excellent basis for e-governance [19]. 
Merging RFID and blockchain technologies is a novel idea and has seen some implementation in industry 
particularly the tracking of wood in the lumber industry [7]. The blockchain in this implementation 
provides a digital paper trail for the lifecycle of the wood and RFID is used to identify the items in 
question. The concept can be further built upon as the blockchain can hold more than just a paper trail for 
the product in question, it can also hold the next set of instructions in the production chain. Housing some 
or all of the instructions on the product presents an area that could be exploited by malicious actors and 
only serves as a means to lessen the amount of queries that need to take place on the network. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
As we have presented a smart product requires two key components, a database to store the production 
information and a means to identify the product. RFID tags and barcodes can both be used to identify a 
product, however an RFID tag is more versatile and can be rewritten which is favourable. A blockchain can 
be used as a distributed database that has a record of past events and thus is difficult to tamper with. It 
satisfies the availability and integrity criteria of data security and a permissioned blockchain satisfies the 
discretion criteria as well. Naturally the adaptation of such a technology can expect pushback from people 
whose jobs it would automate, but a controlled integration is unavoidable. We can compare blockchains to 
email, since the advent of emails has not eliminated the post office, but made our lives easier. 
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